In this paper, we present two alternative models of trade and unemployment, in which unemployment is generated through a search mechanism. The basic framework of the …rst model is Ricardian in that the only factor of production is labor and trade is based on relative technological di¤erences. The second model has a Heckscher-Ohlin (H-O) framework with two factors of production, namely labor and capital that are intersectorally mobile. Using cross-country data on various measures of trade policy, unemployment and a variety of controls, we …nd strong evidence for the Ricardian prediction that unemployment and trade openness are negatively related (protection and unemployment are positively related). We do not …nd any support for the H-O prediction that this relation between trade openness and unemployment changes from negative to positive as we move from labor-abundant to capital-abundant countries. Our results are robust to the inclusion of controls for labor market institutions and macroeconomic distortions. They hold for both ordinary least squares and instrumental-variables approaches, where the latter accounts for the endogeneity of trade policy to unemployment and possible measurement errors in trade policy variables.
believe that one of the important e¤ects of trade is the destruction of jobs, leading to signi…cant unemployment. Such reports are common in the various popular forms of the news media which completely ignore the creation of new jobs as a result of international trade. 2 Therefore, there is a need for not only theoretical work but also rigorous empirical work investigating the e¤ects of trade on unemployment. 3 In this paper, we present two alternative models of trade and unemployment. While the mechanism generating unemployment is the same, namely search unemployment, in both models, the structure of the economy in one model is di¤erent from that in the other. One has a Ricardian structure where trade is generated purely due to relative technological di¤erences, the other framework is Heckscher-Ohlin where trade is generated as a result of relative factor endowment di¤erences.
Due to the di¤erent economic structures, we have di¤erent predictions on the e¤ects of trade on unemployment from the two models. While the Ricardian model predicts that trade liberalization (or tari¤ reduction)
will result in a reduction in unemployment, the Heckscher-Ohlin structure predicts that this will happen only if the country in question is labor-abundant. In the Heckscher-Ohlin model of trade and unemployment, trade liberalization in fact can increase unemployment in a labor-scarce economy. While this second part of the Heckscher-Ohlin prediction has the potential to be music to the ears of protectionists in developed countries, our empirical work does not support this prediction. We in fact …nd strong empirical support from our cross-country regressions for the Ricardian prediction that trade openness and unemployment are negatively related across all countries. It is important here to understand the intuition behind this result.
Trade in a two-sector Ricardian model results in an increase in the value of the marginal product of labor in one of the sectors (the export sector) due to an increase in the domestic relative price of the good produced in that sector. Since the other sector (the import-competing sector), where the marginal product of labor 2 A search of news articles in the New York Times since 1990, reveals a total of 275 articles on NAFTA as the primary subject.
Out of this, 147 articles talk about job destruction in the US as a consequence of NAFTA. Also, Davidson and Matusz (2004) point out that most of the statements made in the House and the Senate during the NAFTA debate were about NAFTA's impact on jobs. They point out, that in sharp contrast, there is not a listing for unemployment in the index of the 4000 pages long Handbook of International Economics, primarily used by academic economists. 3 Empirical work on trade and unemployment is virtually non-existent. An exception is some analysis of the correlation between job destruction and net exports across sectors in chapter 4 of the book by Davidson and Matusz (2004) . They …nd a negative correlation between the two (equivalent to a positive correlation between net imports and job destruction), and perform some further regressions to look deeper into this correlation. See Davidson and Matusz (2005) for a more detailed empirical analysis. For an in-depth and interesting political-economy empirical analysis of how labor turnover in the US determines support for or against free trade and whether it is along factor lines or industry lines, see Magee, Davidson and Matusz (2002) .
would have been lower, cannot survive trade liberalization, the economywide value of marginal product of labor also goes up. There is more investment in job search and the posting of jobs and we get a reduction in unemployment.
It is also important to understand the intuition behind the alternative Heckscher-Ohlin prediction that does not hold in the data. Unlike in the …rst model where the only factor of production is labor, the two tradable goods here are produced using labor and capital. Firms can rent capital anytime they decide to hire a worker and undertake production. In an economy that is capital abundant relative to rest of the world, before the opening of trade the relative price of the capital intensive good is lower than in the rest of the world. Therefore, opening up to trade will imply an increase in the relative price of the capital-intensive good in this country. Thus the demand for capital goes up and that for labor goes down. There is here a modi…ed
Stolper-Samuelson e¤ect -the wage falls, the rental on capital rises and the unemployment rate rises. The results in this model are reversed in a country that is labor-abundant as trade increases the implicit demand for the services of labor and reduces the implicit demand for the services of capital, which implies that the wage rate goes up and unemployment goes down.
Our empirical work in this paper uses cross-country data. We use a number variables that capture trade policy such as unweighted average tari¤s, import weighted average import duty, the overall trade restrictiveness index (OTRI), a measure that includes both formal and informal barriers to trade, a variable measuring the non-tari¤ barrier (NTB) coverage ratio and the standard measure of openness measured as the ratio of trade to GDP. The dependent variable is overall national unemployment rate. We use several control variables that capture the varying labor-market institutions across countries. These capture the strength of labor unions, labor-market rigidity, the nature of labor laws etc. Other controls capture the varying macroeconomic economic environments of the di¤erent countries. These controls include variables such as output volatility, black-market premium etc. We also check robustness of results to instrumenting our trade policy variables. The reasons for instrumenting arise from the endogeneity of trade policy to unemployment as well possible measurement errors in trade policy variables. The instruments we use include the number of years as a GATT/WTO member since the GATT was founded, a developing country dummy (to capture the fact that developing country members might be given concessions in GATT with respect to reciprocity in trade liberalization as well as the fact that their income tax systems might not be advanced enough) and a lagged variable to capture reliance on tax revenues from domestic sources. For the traditional openness measure, we use gravity-based variables and additional geographical variables as instruments. Finally, since
we are looking at steady-state predictions of these models, we primarily use decade averages of data.
We …nd strong evidence for the Ricardian prediction that unemployment and trade openness are negatively related (protection and unemployment are positively related). We do not …nd any support for the H-O prediction that the relation between trade and unemployment changes from negative to positive as we move from labor-abundant to capital-abundant countries. Our results are robust to the inclusion and exclusion of controls and hold using both ordinary least squares as well as instrumental-variables approaches.
The plan of the rest of the paper is as follows. We …rst present a simple Ricardian model with search unemployment and derive the implications of trade liberalization on unemployment. Then we present results of trade liberalization on unemployment in a Heckscher-Ohlin model with search unemployment, the details of which are given in an appendix. Having derived our empirical predictions from the theoretical model, we undertake empirical analysis.
2 The Model
Production Structure
The economy produces a single …nal good and two intermediate goods. respectively. The production function for the …nal good is as follows:
Given the prices p x ; and p y ; of inputs, the unit cost for producing Z is given as follows.
Since Z is chosen as the numeraire, c(p x ; p y ) = 1; or
The above demand functions imply the following relative demand for the two intermediate goods.
Labor is the only factor of production. The total number of workers in the economy is L each supplying one unit of labor inelastically when employed: Our description of the labor market corresponds to a standard Pissarides (2000) style search model embedded in a two sector set up. A producing unit in the intermediate goods production is a job-worker match. New producing pairs are created at a rate determined by a matching function of two measures of labor market participation, vacancies and unemployment. Job destruction is a response to idiosyncratic shocks to the productivity of existing job-worker matches.
For X production a unit of labor should be matched with an entrepreneur who has the technology to produce the intermediate good X: Similarly, for the production of Y a unit of labor should be matched with an entrepreneur who has the technology to produce the intermediate good Y: A worker-job match in sector i = x; y produces output h i : If L i is the total number of workers employed in sector i; then the aggregate production in each sector is given by
Therefore, the relative supply of the two intermediate goods is
The total number of matches in the labor market is determined by the matching technology. Assume the following simple matching technology. Denote the number of vacancies in the economy per unit of time by vL and the number of unemployed per unit of time by uL: De…ne = v u as a measure of market tightness. We assume that unemployed workers search for a job and can be randomly matched with an employer in either of the two sectors. That is, despite having two sectors for production there is an integrated labor market. The ‡ow of matches per unit of time is a linear homogeneous function of uL and vL: For simplicity we assume a Cobb-Douglas form of matching technology:
With this speci…cation the job …nding rate for an unemployed is simply M uL = m ; while the rate at which vacant jobs are …lled is simply M vL = m 1 : Clearly, the former is an increasing function of the market tightness, while the latter is a decreasing function of the market tightness.
Denote the recruitment cost in terms of the …nal good by : The unemployment bene…t for workers is …xed in terms of the …nal good at b: The wage of workers in sector-i is w i in terms of the numeraire good:
We assume that the matches in each sector are broken at an exogenous rate of per period. can be viewed as an arrival rate of a shock that leads to job destruction. Given the above description of labor market, the net ‡ow into unemployment per period of time is
In the steady-state the rate of unemployment is constant. Therefore, the steady-state unemployment in the economy is given by
To solve for the endogenous variables of interest-p x ; p y ; w i ; ; u we proceed as follows. Start with a particular pair of prices p x and p y satisfying equation (2) . Once a job is …lled, an entrepreneur in sector-i receives the ‡ow of the value of output from the match h i p i less the sectoral wage (w i ) until the match is dissolved. Let J i be the present discounted value of a …lled job in sector i and V i the present discounted value of a vacant job in sector i. Then, in steady state, the entrepreneur's problem is characterized by two
Bellman equations
Given free entry, all pro…t opportunities from posting vacancies are exploited. Hence, V i = 0: Substituting this condition into equations (6) and (7) implies
Let W i denote the present discounted value of employment in sector i and U the present discounted value of unemployment for a worker. Then, in steady state, the worker's problem is also characterized by two Bellman equations:
where W e is the expected value of employment for a worker who may end up with a job in either of the two sectors.
Wage is determined through a process of Nash bargaining between the worker and the entrepreneur. In the appendix, we derive the following expression for wage.
Since wages are identical in the two sectors, (12) implies that the relative goods price must satisfy the following.
The result above implies that despite the presence of search generated unemployment the relative goods prices are determined completely by technology as in the standard Ricardian model. The absolute prices .p x and p y are determined by equations (2) and (13) . Given this the other variables of interest -w; ; and uare determined by the following 3 equations.
Comparative Statics

Changes in labor-market rigidity parameters
Note from (14)- (15) that
Therefore, for a given product price ratio, a higher b; or leads to a lower and consequently a higher unemployment.
International Trade
Suppose this economy is now opened up to international trade. Also, suppose this economy has a comparative advantage in X and is a small open economy. Therefore, the autarky price of X is less than its world price.
Using the A superscript to denote autarky and W superscript to denote world, we have (14)- (15) that d dp
Therefore, dw dpx > 0 and du dpx < 0: Starting from a positive tari¤ on good Y , trade liberalization has a similar e¤ect. Even though there is complete specialization in this model, unemployment responds to tari¤ here.
An increase in tari¤ leads to a reduction in the domestic price of X and therefore a reduction in w and an increase in the unemployment rate. This gives the following result:
Proposition 1 Opening up to trade or a reduction in import tari¤ s in a Ricardian model with search generated unemployment leads to a decrease in unemployment and an increase in the real wage of workers.
A similar result can be derived in a Ricardian model with a continuum of goods.
Extension: The Heckscher-Ohlin Model
Let us alter the above model to a two factor model and assume that X and Y are produced using labor and capital. Firms can rent capital anytime they decide to hire a worker and undertake production. For simplicity we assume that …rms can return the capital to the owner upon the destruction of a job. Let us assume that X is more capital intensive than Y:Assuming that our economy is capital abundant relative to rest of the world, before the opening of trade in the intermediate goods the relative price of the capital intensive intermediate good X is lower here than in the rest of the world. Therefore, opening up to trade will imply an increase in the relative price of X in the home country. This implies an increase in p x and a decrease in p y : Thus the demand for capital goes up and that for labor goes down. We show in the appendix that this leads to a modi…ed Stolper-Samuelson e¤ect -the wage falls, the rental on capital rises and the unemployment rate rises. Results are reversed in a country that is labor-abundant as trade increases the implicit demand for the services of labor and reduces the implicit demand for the services of capital, the wage rate goes up and unemployment goes down. The results derived in the appendix are summarized below.
Proposition 2
The impact of international trade (or an import tari¤ reduction) on a capital abundant country is a decrease in the wage rate and an increase in the rate of unemployment of labor, while in the case of a labor-abundant country the wage rate goes up and unemployment goes down as a result of trade liberalization.
Data Description
To examine the relationship between trade protection and unemployment we collected data on multiple trade policy measures, unemployment rates and a variety of controls over the period 1990-2000.
Unemployment rate
Our dependent variable is the unemployment rate (as percentage of the labor force) from the International Finance Statistics. This variable is averaged over the decade of the 1990s to smooth out any business cycle ‡uctuations. We have data on 92 countries and the variable ranges from a low of 0.9% for Azerbaijan to a high of 55.6% for Ethiopia.
Trade Policies
Countries may resort to a variety of policy instruments in order to protect trade. These include: tari¤s, quotas, non-automatic licensing, antidumping duties, countervailing duties, tari¤ rate quotas, export taxes, etc. Finding a single measure of trade protection that summarizes such a multiplicity of instruments is a task economists have long struggled with. Often the literature relies on outcome measures such as trade ‡ows, e.g.,
X+M
GDP . The rationale is that this trade ‡ow measure summarizes the impact of the underlying trade policy instruments. The problem is that they also vary with di¤erences in tastes, macroeconomic shocks, geographic attributes, and other factors such as rainfall, which could be falsely attributed to trade policy.
Single measures such an average tari¤ rate or a quota coverage ratio may only capture a fraction of the protectionist position of the country.
To account for these problems we use not simply the outcome measure X+M GDP mentioned above but also a variety of direct trade policy measures. Our …rst direct measure is the unweighted average external tari¤ data recently made available by the World Bank. A second measure is total import duties collected as a percentage of total imports from the World Development Indicators. 4 The problem with both variables is that trade policy is determined at the tari¤ line level and with more than 5000 tari¤ lines in the tari¤ schedule of developing and developed countries, summarizing all this information in one aggregate measure, through weighted or unweighted averages, may yield inaccurate or incomplete measures. 5 While neither the 4 Note the import duty measure is a weighted average of import duties on each good where the weights are the share of imports of that good in total imports. 5 For example, for the import duty measure, imports subject to high protection rates are likely to be small and therefore average tari¤ measure nor the import duty measure is perfect, Rodrik and Rodriguez (2000) argue that these are the most direct measures of trade restrictions, that there is little evidence for the existence of serious biases in these indicators, and that they do a relatively decent job in ranking countries according to the restrictiveness of their trade regimes. We supplement the tari¤ measures with a quota coverage ratio, which measures the non-tari¤ barrier frequency. This variable is available for only 28 countries for a single year in the 1990s.
To tackle the shortcoming of these three direct measures of trade protection, Kee, Nicita and Olarreaga Finally, it may be argued that attention needs to be paid not just to formal trade barriers but also to informal ones such as corruption in customs, and the time and costs of navigating administrative red tape. Anderson and Marcouiller (2002) show that these informal barriers to trade can be modeled as a tax equivalent on imports and that trade expands dramatically when supported by a legal system capable of enforcing commercial contracts and by transparent and impartial formulation and implementation of government economic policy. Similarly, the WTO strongly believes that agreements on trade facilitation will provide a signi…cant boost to world trade. We use a measure from the Economic Freedom of the World Project, which itself is based on a survey question from the Global Competitiveness Report that asks respondents to rate hidden import barriers. Countries receive a rating from 0-10 with higher numbers indicating lower barriers. We combine this rating with a similar rating on formal trade barriers (tari¤s and trade tax revenues) using a simple average and recode it as (10 original rating) to obtain our GCR Measure of trade barriers. This variable is available for a single year in the 1990s.
will be attributed small weights in an import-weighted aggregation, which would underestimate the restrictiveness of those tari¤s. Similarly, for the unweighted average tari¤ measure, very low tari¤s on economically meaningless goods would create a downward bias in this measure of trade protection.
Controls
Botero et al (2004) argue that every country in the world has established a complex system of laws and institutions intended to protect the interests of workers and to help assure a minimum standard of living for its population. These include employment laws that govern the individual employment contract, and collective or industrial relations laws that regulate the bargaining, adoption, and enforcement of collective agreements, the organization of trade unions, and the industrial action by workers and employers. We Recessions and expansions, booms and busts are a standard feature of most economies in the world today.
In recent years, the severity of such output volatility has accelerated as many countries have experienced signi…cant economic crisis -examples include the Latin American debt crisis, the East Asian …nancial crisis, the collapse of output in the former Communist states of Eastern Europe. These countries all experienced high levels of unemployment in the post-crisis phase, some for long periods of time such as Indonesia and Russia. To control for this e¤ect, we include a measure of output volatility. We follow Ramey and Ramey (1995) and measure output volatility as the standard deviation of the annual growth rate of GDP per capita for each of the countries in our sample over the period 1990-2000. We also included the Black Market Premium on the exchange rate to capture macroeconomic distortions. Finally, to allow for the unemployment rates to di¤er with the level of development, we control for the size of the economy using a measure of labor force and real GDP from World Development Indicators. The two controls together are tantamount to using GDP per worker as a control. Table 1 provides the summary statistics, a brief description of all our variables, and the various data sources used.
4 Trade Protection and Unemployment: Results
Ricardian Speci…cation
Proposition 1 states that within a Ricardian model a higher tari¤ should lead to higher levels of unemployment. We evaluate this proposition by regressing the unemployment rate on each of our 6 measures of trade policy. Our objective is to examine whether, more protectionist countries experience higher rates of unemployment, and whether this relationship is robust to controlling for labor laws, macroeconomic distortions and country size, and to endogeneity concerns, and that the relationship holds both across countries and within countries over time. Tables 2 and 3 check the robustness of this relationship to alternate measures of protection and to the inclusion of controls. Table 2 shows that almost all our measures of trade protection, are positively and signi…cantly associated with higher rates of unemployment. 8 The exception is the quota measure which has the right sign, but is not signi…cant. The data on the quota measure is limited and the measure is also subject measurement error (see Harrigan, 1993) . 9 All models as a whole are signi…cant and our variables account for 4-24% of the cross-country variation in unemployment rates. Table 3 shows that this relationship is robust to controlling for country size, for labor union power, for employment laws, for macroeconomic distortions and ‡uctuations, and civil liberties. All models as a whole are signi…cant and our variables account for 21-33% of 8 Note that X+M GDP is a measure of openness so we expect a negative sign on this variable. 9 It also does not distinguish between barriers that are highly restrictive and barriers that are not binding and have little e¤ect. Nor is it possible to measure the impact of relaxing quotas on trade ‡ows. The coverage ratio only suggests that barriers to trade exist, but cannot measure their e¤ect.
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the cross-country variation in unemployment rates. In terms of the controls, we …nd evidence that countries where labor unions have greater power also exhibit higher rates of unemployment. This is consistent with the outcome of our comparative static exercise with respect to our labor-market parameters in our theory section.
The numbers in table 3 imply that a 1% increase in the average tari¤ rate increases the unemployment rate by more than 0.3%. Across protection measures, the unweighted tari¤ rate has the strongest e¤ect -a one standard deviation increase in leads to a 2.7% increase in the unemployment rate. The corresponding numbers for import duties, OTRI, GCR, and openness measures are 2.4%, 1.6%, 2.3% and -1.6%, respectively.
Finally, we experimented with a host of other controls to convince ourselves of the robustness of our results. These include per capita GDP in lieu of GDP, the growth rate of per capita GDP, the real interest rate, a deterioration in the terms of trade (between the decade of the 80s and 90s), a rigidity of employment index from the World Bank's "Doing Business"database, and a measure of domestic distortions from Alesina and Perotti (1996) . The predicted e¤ect of trade restrictions survives across these permutations. 10 
Instrumental Variable Estimates
There are two potential problems with the results reported in table 3: omitted variables and endogeneity of trade policies. It is plausible to argue that an omitted variable may a¤ect both unemployment and trade policies, or that countries that exhibit more unemployment face populist pressures (domestically) to raise trade barriers (reverse causality). Indeed, this version of the reverse causality argument does generate a positive (conditional) correlation between unemployment and protection. We address these concerns by using instrumental variables. 11 Incidentally, instrumental variables will help us also deal with measurement error problems, which might be present in many of the protectionist measures, especially the quota measure.
The presence of measurement error creates an attenuation bias, i.e., it works against …nding a signi…cant relationship between protectionism and unemployment. If the instruments help us deal with the measurement error we should see an increase in the absolute value of the coe¢ cient. If, on the other hand, endogeneity has an important impact on our OLS estimates, then we should see a decrease in the absolute value of the 1 0 These results are available upon request. 4). Table 4 shows the IV results and we see that the coe¢ cient on all protectionist measures, apart from OTRI, remains positive and signi…cant, while that on X+M GDP remains negative and signi…cant. Even in the case of OTRI, it is marginally signi…cant at around the 12 percent level and has the correct sign. Moreover, now the quota variable is signi…cant as well. However, the number of observations for both the OTRI and the quota measure is small, so that inferences for these measures are less likely to be valid. For a majority of the measures of trade policies, we observe only a marginal decline in the absolute value of the estimates (when we restrict our OLS estimates to the same set of countries as those in table 4.)
Next we provide purely economic arguments as to why the instruments we use are good instruments. None of these variables should be correlated with unemployment directly in addition to being related to it through our right-hand side variables, i.e., the instrumental variables should not be correlated with the error terms of our regressions. For example, the number of years outside the GATT/WTO will a¤ect unemployment only through the tari¤ level. Also this variable is not expected to be endogenous to unemployment. Whether a country is developed or developing should not be related to unemployment directly in either direction, 
Estimation with Panel Data
Our next objective is to examine how shifts in the degree of protection within a country a¤ects the unemployment rate. This should provide strong evidence on the link between the two. This task is non-trivial given that unemployment rates are subject to business cycle ‡uctuations and data on protection measures is not available over long periods of time. Moreover, trade policies tend to be very stable over time. Despite this di¢ culty in capturing the time-variation in the trade protection data series, we attempt to provide at least a partial view of the robustness of our results using within-country variation.
We create a panel of 10-year averaged data starting in 1980 which results in two nonoverlapping periods.
Data is available over time for only three of our trade policy measures -the unweighted tari¤, import duties and X+M GDP . OTRI, GCR and quota are available only for a single year as is data on employment laws and labor union power. In table 5 we present pooled OLS results with these three measures of trade protection. Columns 1-3 show that across measure of trade policy a rise in protectionism is associated with a rise in unemployment rates. We also …nd that country with more rigid employment laws also exhibit higher rates of unemployment. To address the reverse causality concern, that countries with higher levels of unemployment are more likely to be protectionist, columns 4-6 use the trade policy measure from the previous decade. Our results again show that countries that were more protectionist in the past exhibit higher rates of unemployment in subsequent years. 14 A …xed e¤ects regression for this two period panel does not indicate a signi…cant e¤ect of any of the trade policy measures on unemployment. But such a result could also be due to the fact that there may simply not be enough within-country variation in the variables of interest. To capture this variation, we next use a yearly panel and present results with country speci…c …xed e¤ects. The …xed e¤ects dramatically reduces the scope for omitted variables and mis-measurement that may plague our estimates, as the intercepts take out all variation that is time-invariant and speci…c to a particular country. Preliminary analyses also indicate the presence of serial correlation and that the residuals follow a …rst order autoregressive process 15 Accordingly, we use the …xed e¤ects estimation procedure from Baltagi and Wu (1999) with AR(1) disturbances for the error term.
Columns 1-6 in table 6 presents these results. 16 The …rst three columns use contemporaneous trade policy 1 4 We also examined how this relationship changes when we include lagged unemployment rates as regressors. While this results in biased estimates, we …nd that lagged unemployment enters with a positive and signi…cant sign, and that the import duty and the trade ‡ows measure signi…cantly a¤ect the unemployment rate in the predicted direction. 1 5 We use the Baltagi-Wu statistic to check for serial correlation. This statistic is equivalent to the Durbin-Watson statistic and is the relevant statistic for a test of serial correlation in the case of an unbalanced panel. We obtain a value of the Baltagi-Wu statistic far below 2 which indicates that correction for serial correlation is necessary.
measures while the second three columns lag each measure by a year. We see that countries that initiated a decline in their overall unweighted tari¤s experienced a fall in their unemployment rates. Similarly, those countries that became more open in terms of trade volumes (our outcome measure of trade orientation) also experienced a signi…cant decline in unemployment rates. We fail to …nd evidence for this relationship for the import duty measure. Our numbers imply that a 1% decline in the unweighted tari¤ reduces unemployment rate by 0.06%, while a 1% increase in trade ‡ows (lagged by a year) reduces unemployment by 0.11%.
Hecksher-Ohlin speci…cation
As Proposition 2 states, within a Hecksher-Ohlin world, an increase in trade restrictions will raise unemployment in labor abundant countries and reduce them in capital-abundant countries. As a …rst pass, we classi…ed each country as capital or labor abundant according to whether its capital-labor ratio in 1990 was above or below the median capital-labor ratio. Next, we regressed unemployment on the trade protection measures separately for the capital-abundant sample and for the labor-abundant sample. For both samples, and for each of the direct measures of trade restrictions, we obtain a positive coe¢ cient on trade protection.
However, subdividing the sample on the basis of the median is somewhat ad hoc. A priori, we do not know the critical level of (K=L) where the relationship between trade restrictions and unemployment changes sign.
The following speci…cation takes care of this problem by allowing the data to tell us the exact location of this turning point:
where T R i is the extent of trade restrictions in country i, Unemployment i is the measure of unemployment, (K=L) i is the capital-labor ratio for the year 1990 and X i is a row vector of control variables. Taking the partial derivative of U nempolyment i with respect to TR i , we have
The prediction of the Proposition 2 is that 1 > 0 and 2 < 0 such that 1 + 2 (K=L) i ? 0 as (K=L) i 7
(K=L) where (K=L) = 1 = 2 is the turning point capital-labor ratio determined endogenously from the data, given our estimating equation. Another requirement for the prediction to hold is that (K=L) should lie within the range of values of (K=L) in the dataset, i.e., (K=L) countries exhibit a negative relation between trade volumes and openness. 17 
Conclusions
In this paper, we present two alternative models, namely Ricardian and Heckscher-Ohlin, of trade and unemployment, in which unemployment is generated through a search mechanism. Our results provide strong evidence for Proposition 1 that comes out of our Ricardian model: protectionism increases unemployment rates both across countries and within countries over time. This relationship is robust to controlling for employment laws, trade union power, civil liberties, country and labor force size. Resolving endogeneity concerns through the use of instrumental variables estimation leaves our results qualitatively una¤ected. We also obtain some evidence that Proposition 1 is valid within countries over time as well. On the other hand, there is almost no evidence for the Hecksher-Ohlin proposition which states that the impact of trade policies on unemployment is conditional on whether the country is labor abundant or capital abundant. Instead, using the Hecksher-Ohlin speci…cation indicates that for almost all countries protectionist policies lead to higher levels of unemployment, validating the Ricardian speci…cation instead.
A Appendix:
A.1 Determination of wage in the Ricardian search model
The equations (10) and (11) imply the following
Nash bargaining implies that w i is given by
where 0 1 captures the bargaining power of workers. The …rst order condition is given by
The above expression relates the worker surplus from the match to the entrepreneur's surplus. Substituting into equation (21) from equations (19) and (8) gives a solution for the wage:
From the above expression it is clear that w x = w y ; that is, the wage is the same in both sectors. This also implies that W x = W y = W e ; which in turn implies from (10) and (11)
Using the above expression and (8) in (21) we get the following convenient form for wage which is reported in the text.
A.2 Heckscher-Ohlin Model with unemployment
Instead of a single factor of production, suppose there are two factors of production: labor and capital.
Once a match is created, a …rm rents capital and undertakes production. For simplicity, assume that …rms can return the capital to the owner upon the destruction of a job. The production functions in the two intermediate goods sectors, once the matches are formed, are given by
k i is the capital per worker in sector-i: If L i is the total number of workers employed in sector i; then the aggregate production in each sector is given by
The total amount of capital employed in sector i is
Further it is assumed that x > y ; which guarantees that X is more capital intensive than Y: The wage in sector-i is denoted by w i and the rental of capital by r:
The description of the labor market is exactly the same as in the Ricardian model described in the text.
Therefore, the economywide unemployment rate is
Therefore, if we know we can …nd the rate of unemployment in the economy. Next we look at the determination of : The asset value of a vacant job, V i ; is characaterized by the following Bellman equation
Again free entry implies V i = 0; which implies the following from (26)
The value from an occupied job, J i ; satis…es the following Bellman equation
Making use of (28) to substitute out J i from equation (27) we get the following equation
(29) is another way to write the zero pro…t condition from a vacant job mentioned earlier.
The optimal choice of k i is determined by maximizing J i in equation (28) taking the wage rate w and the rental r as given. This leads to the following condition governing the optimal choice of k i
On the worker side, everything is exactly the same as in the text. Therefore, Nash bargaining implies the following equation for wages.
Using the same steps as discussed in the text, it can be veri…ed that the wages must be the same in the two sectors: w x = w y : The equation determining wages can be written in a convenient form as follows.
Since wages are the same in the two sectors, from (29) we get
The total capital stock of the economy is given by K: The market clearing condition in the factor market implies the following.
(1 u)L is the share of sector X in the total labor force, and L x is the amount of labor employed in sector X in steady state.
The model is solved as follows. Start with any px py . The absolute prices p x and p y corresponding to this px py are obtained from (2) . For this pair of prices p x and p y the following 7 variables-w; r; ; u; "; k x , and k y can be found from the equations derived above, which are gathered below.
In (34)-(37) there are 3 independent equations, and therefore, 7 independent equations in (34)- (41) determine the 7 endogenous variables of interest: w; r; ; u; "; k x , and k y : The relative supply of the two intermediate goods X and Y at these prices can be written as
Next we show that the relative supply of good X is increasing in the relative price this implies a decrease in p x k x x rk x as well. Now, it can be easily shown that this leads to a decrease in w; , and consequently an increase in u:
Next, from equation (41) we have
Therefore, an increase in p px py implies an unambiguous increase in ": With a little bit of algebra it can be veri…ed that (45) implies All regressions include a constant (not reported). Standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% All variables are averaged over the 1990s, except OTRI, GCR trade barriers and Quota which are available for a single year. Standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% All variables are averaged over the 1990s, except OTRI, TRI and Quota which are available for a single year. Employment laws index and labor union power are available only for 1997. The last 2 rows divides the number of observations into countries that have a positive and countries that have a negative relation between trade policy and unemployment rate.
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